The Internet as Marketplace of Madness— and a Terrorist’s Best Friend by Rosenbaum, Thane
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 86 Issue 2 Article 11 
2017 
The Internet as Marketplace of Madness— and a Terrorist’s Best 
Friend 
Thane Rosenbaum 
New York University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Communications Law Commons, Computer Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, 
Criminal Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thane Rosenbaum, The Internet as Marketplace of Madness— and a Terrorist’s Best Friend, 86 Fordham 
L. Rev. 591 (2017). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol86/iss2/11 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 591 
ESSAY:  THE INTERNET AS MARKETPLACE OF 
MADNESS—AND A TERRORIST’S BEST FRIEND 
Thane Rosenbaum* 
 
Imagine the old days—pre-9/11, when there was no Department of 
Homeland Security because the United States, due to favorable geography 
and peaceable neighbors, had no special reason to fear for the security of its 
homeland, when terrorism was something largely for Israelis to worry about, 
and when airline passengers barely took notice of airport security officers, 
and vice-versa. 
And, of course, there was no internet—before cell phones became smart, 
handheld computers, and also deadly detonation devices.  The words “social” 
and “network” were never found in the same sentence because they are 
oxymoronic when positioned together, notwithstanding the bonds of 
friendship and socialization promised on Facebook.  Indeed, it’s difficult 
nowadays to recall a time preinternet when such a word sounded more like 
the “interstate,” evoking long cross-country drives rather than the grander but 
sunless open frontier of the digital highway. 
The panel I was assigned to, for this distinguished gathering of scholars at 
Fordham Law School, where I had previously been a professor for twenty-
three years, was given the name, “Caution Against Overreaching.”  
Overreaching and the caution it occasions, in this case, refer to the First 
Amendment, a uniquely American absolutist, legalistic obsession.  For many 
who fixate on such matters, the government must never be allowed to trample 
upon the unfettered free speech rights guaranteed under America’s first, and 
most favorite, Amendment. 
So, let me state categorically, right at the outset, that when it comes to the 
boundaries of the First Amendment—both its limits and extreme excesses—
I am not in favor of exercising caution to avoid overreach.  Overreach and 
overinclusiveness do not carry the same stigma outside of the academy.  The 
Patriot Act, for instance, receives a more favorable hearing in the public 
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sphere.  Constitutional interpretation that allows for overreach may save 
lives.  Surely if the goal is to catch the bad guys, and there are such people 
scheming in lairs far below the ivory tower, where such mischief is not 
merely an academic exercise, and where coconspirators or lone wolves speak 
not abstractly, hypothetically, or for argument’s sake, but definitively, then 
overreach can become an unqualified lifesaver. 
If that sort of thing matters to you. 
I do not believe that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment is 
untouchable and sacrosanct, simply beyond the realm of reasonable, sensible 
government regulation.  It’s a short amendment, glorious in its intention, to 
be sure, but imperfect in application, too.  For those who regard the First 
Amendment as holy, like a page from the Gospels, Torah, or Koran, I 
respectfully suggest speaking with people who have been harmed by 
immoderate, recklessly delivered and, at times, deadly speech.  It wouldn’t 
be the first time when violence arises from the slavish, reflexive devotion to 
a holy book.  And the First Amendment is a secular religion of sorts.  When 
the exercise of free speech results in injury to another human being and, even 
more crucially, as with the global War on Terror, the inevitable loss of life, 
it’s best to ask the simple question:  What would George Washington do?  
Isn’t that, appropriately, what a First Amendment fundamentalist should ask? 
Ironically, First and Second Amendment absolutists, on ideological and 
cultural grounds, appear to have nothing in common, except for one 
unpleasant feature:  they are both natural, incurable hysterics—psychotic 
cousins, if you will.  In the mind of a gun owner for whom the Second 
Amendment is ardently first in his heart, regulating the sale or possession of 
assault rifles is the slippery slope before the government takes away a deer 
rifle or a small handgun.  Similarly, for the First Amendment absolutist, 
preventing neo-Nazis from marching in a hamlet of Holocaust survivors, or 
prohibiting cross burnings on the lawns of African Americans, or carving a 
zone of grief so a father can bury a son killed in action while serving his 
country and not have his private moment interrupted by protestors opposing 
homosexuals in the military, is the slippery slope that instantly leads to 
government tyranny and the silencing of political dissent. 
No, it’s not.  Only a zealot would draw that conclusion.  When the religious 
hold too fast to the literal word on the page or parchment—refusing to allow 
for any deviation, fearing that anything less than an orthodox reading might 
unleash the end of days—secular people understandably register disgust.  
Why should the secular scripture of the Constitution, and its equally fervent 
adherents, not produce a similar skepticism? 
“Slippery slope” thinking is one of those quaint but ultimately toxic 
artifacts of the law school experience that dulls the imagination and is all too 
frequently invoked as an excuse to avoid having to take righteous positions 
and engage in moral decision-making. 
Terrorism is one excellent example where overreaching in the service of 
saving lives does not seem to be such a great departure from the origins and 
intentions of our constitutional democracy.  Indeed, the Preamble to the 
Constitution itself suggests that forming “a more perfect Union,” securing 
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the “Blessings of Liberty” for “Posterity,” insuring “domestic Tranquility,” 
and providing “for the common defen[s]e” are what the Articles and 
Amendments were drafted to reinforce, and not the other way around.1 
The First Amendment should not be read as a red-herring work-around to 
avoid having to defend the nation and secure its future.  There is much pride 
that Americans take in the very first amendment to its founding charter.  And 
it very much is richly emblematic of the rights of man and the realization of 
the democratic experiment.  Yet, protecting the nation from foreign attack is 
no less a liberal and enlightened value.  A perfect union does not materialize 
if the Constitution is exploited, its endowed purpose undermined, thwarted, 
and overridden.  The Constitution is neither a “suicide pact,” in the words 
and estimations of Justices Arthur Goldberg and Robert Jackson, 
respectively,2 nor is it an unworkable, maddening Rubik’s Cube of 
contradiction. 
A strict adherence to the Constitution must always be consistent with the 
common defense.  Otherwise our founding documents are mere booby traps, 
rife with legalistic pitfalls, drafted to weaponize America’s enemies, freely 
handing them the secret to cracking the code of our Constitution.  Why would 
the framers have drafted a Preamble with such soaring declarative language 
to guard the gates of our newfound freedom if the enumerated rights were 
ultimately impediments to carrying out that duty?  The Constitution can’t be 
expected to stand by as an obstacle to its own survival—more of a lifeless 
monument than a living document. 
Yes, free speech is an inalienable right—but at what cost? 
One can feel smug in demanding a rigid fidelity to constitutional 
guarantees.  But then one can’t also complain if our democracy comes to an 
abrupt halt by zealots wearing suicide bomber’s vests, snickering at the 
thought that a constitutional zealot made their detonations possible.  The 
reason we fear zealots is because they are out of control in their beliefs, 
unable to call attention to other values.  We should not be playing favorites.  
First Amendment absolutists need to take a hard look at the world and ask 
why, when it comes to fighting extremism, America should be playing by 
different, more exacting rules.  Does anyone doubt that the Founding Fathers, 
who waged a war and achieved an improbable win in pursuit of liberty, did 
not fully comprehend the obligation they imposed upon this new nation, as 
exemplified in the Constitution’s Preamble, to provide “for the common 
defen[s]e”? 
The entire Fordham Law Review symposium is devoted to a discussion of 
Terrorist Incitement on the Internet, a provocative title because terrorism 
before the internet was a menace desperate for a search engine.  The internet 
provided terrorism with the respectability and tactical advantage it lacked in 
the dark ages of easily traceable rotary-dialing phones and Xeroxed leaflets.  
 
 1. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 40 
(2010). 
 2. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963); Terminiello v. City of 
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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How did terrorists gather together in those days?  Where did they meet?  How 
did they chat?  Without the internet, terrorist cells had as much visibility as 
actual microorganisms.  Without cyberspace, learning how to make a bomb 
from household detergents had the same degree of difficulty as traveling to 
outer space.  Demented, demonic clerics preaching jihad from their bedrooms 
were essentially talking to the mirror until YouTube turned them into 
genocidal reality TV stars.  It was the Wild West of terrorism before it all got 
imported from the Middle East—globalized and homegrown, all courtesy of 
the fast-moving traffic and lethal leverage of the digital divide. 
So much has changed since those more tranquil times; so much chaos has 
been introduced into our ever more fragile world.  Back then, nonstate actors 
with big dreams of caliphates and beholden to medieval doctrines inspired 
little fear.  Airline hijackings were for wimps.  This was the age of 
superpowers playing war games of mutually assured destruction.  The 
missiles got ominously longer and the warheads carried more payload.  But, 
fortunately, those with their fingers on the button were not out of their minds.  
The “War” was named “Cold” for a reason.  Brinksmanship served as a 
substitute for dead bodies.  The cloak-and-dagger intrigues of the CIA and 
KGB made for great movies but never reached the point of triggering fail-
safe procedures.  Nuclear Armageddon was a horrifying thought that never 
got past the planning stages and the occasional emergency drill in fallout 
shelters across the United States. 
Anyone reading Learned Hand’s decision in United States v. Dennis3 can 
feel the tension and appreciate the misguided wisdom of not wanting to be 
remembered as one of those “silly dupes” who didn’t fully anticipate the 
dangers of the communist menace.4  The Bomb truly terrified; terrorism, 
however, seemed to be the province of buffoonish practitioners making little 
noise with nonexistent tradecraft. 
And that’s perhaps why American courts have been more accommodating 
of domestic hate groups like the Ku Klux Klan and the neo-Nazisallowing 
for “expressive” activities such as marching and cross burningsthan they 
were of communists with espionage on their minds.5  Yet the Ku Klux Klan 
and the neo-Nazis were truly jayvee6 when compared with ISIS and Al 
Qaeda, with those muscular varsity letters that have essentially become 
acronyms for fear.  The First Amendment challenges they raised—freedom 
of assembly and freedom of speech—were primarily symbolic because the 
 
 3. 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950). 
 4. Id. at 213. 
 5. Compare R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379–80 (1992), and Collin v. 
Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1201–02 (7th Cir. 1978), with Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 
49–51 (1919). 
 6. See Peter Baker, A President Whose Assurances Have Come Back to Haunt Him, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/us/politics/a-president-whose-
assurances-have-come-back-to-haunt-him.html [https://perma.cc/T748-W2HB].  Ironically, 
for the most part, American neo-Nazis and the KKK are mainly interested in threatening and 
intimidating their targets, otherwise vulnerable groups, which should not be protected activity 
under the First Amendment, but at least they are unlike global Islamist extremists, for whom 
murder, not marches, is their tactical weapon of choice. 
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relative risks they posed were virtually nonexistent.  America could afford a 
certain complacency.  The First Amendment always proved to be a lively 
petri dish where the clinical trials of liberty’s limits were best tested.7  The 
harm was relatively contained to only a few precincts of vulnerable 
Americans.8  For the most part, the Klan was never more than a fringe group 
dressed like a mattress sale, and the neo-Nazis were nothing like the originals 
from Germany.  These Brownshirts looked like overgrown cub scouts, 
pathetic wannabees in a nation that had already defeated the Third Reich and 
now regarded the real Nazis as those clowns from Hogan’s Heroes and The 
Producers. 
What was America truly sacrificing by allowing these groups to exercise 
their constitutional rights, wear their doltish uniforms, parade around in lock 
goosestep, burn a cross, or shout “Heil Hitler” under the protective banner of 
the First Amendment?  Surely they have a right to an opinion, moronic 
though it may be.  This is America, after all.  Showing respect and tolerance 
to those who display antidemocratic, illiberal tendencies is a virtue of 
America’s commitment to liberty.  Even those who would instantly abolish 
the Constitution (should they ever come to power) are given the opportunity 
to free ride on our freedoms, avail themselves of our courtrooms, and speak 
openly and hatefully, regardless of how much harm they cause. 
Yes, . . . but can we not at least agree that there is a qualified difference 
between the mass-murdering mayhem and unabashed barbarism of Al Qaeda, 
ISIS, Hamas, and Hezbollah, and the domestic hate groups that have 
frequently challenged the durability of the First Amendment?  The former 
have no interest in testing our courts—they merely wish to blow them up.  
The latter were surprised to discover, thanks to liberal judges and sheltered 
law professors, that that they might have something of value to say that 
should be included in the marketplace of ideas.  As to hate groups, such an 
allowance was a mistake, a misguided concession, an overextension that 
should be reexamined.  Regarding terrorist incitement, however, the battle 
lines should be more confidently and starkly drawn:  jihad is not an idea, it is 
bloodlust. 
Beheadings, dismemberments, the torching of homosexuals, the stoning of 
women, and, of course, suicide bombings of the kind that greeted runners at 
the Boston Marathon and melted the Twin Towers on 9/11, are the calling 
cards of today’s terrorist apparatus.  It most certainly is not the expression of 
an idea that competes in a marketplace; it is the conduct of the criminally 
insane.  The promoters of terrorism on the internet are not fostering a debate 
on matters of public concern.  For them, it is solely about incitement—the 
raising of an army of disaffected, otherwise disconnected Muslims 
 
 7. American courtrooms are like second homes to dissident groups testing the limits of 
the First Amendment.  This is certainly true when compared with other liberal democracies 
around the world that do not extend such generous free speech guarantees to those engaged in 
racial, anti-Semitic, and homophobic bigotry and intimidation. 
 8. Skokie, Illinois, the setting for Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1201–02 (7th Cir. 
1978), was uniquely targeted by neo-Nazis because it was home to a disproportionately large 
number of Holocaust survivors. 
596 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
brainwashed into regarding the infidel as a universal boogeyman, seduced by 
a more active sex life in the afterlife, and jacked up with the promise of 
paradise and the release from the futility of their present lives. 
Thank you, Google, Facebook, and Apple, for making it possible to more 
easily unite the lustful, lonely, and murderous. 
Regardless of what one might think of the twisted beliefs held by the Klan 
and neo-Nazis, their methods have been largely tame and confined to our 
courts.  Inadvertently, perhaps, they have been giving Americans civics 
lessons, courtesy of the free legal services supplied by the American Civil 
Liberties Union.  Where would First Amendment jurisprudence be without 
them? 
By contrast, the widely available sermons on cyberspace by the Islamic 
cleric Anwar al-Awlaki influenced the shooter at Fort Hood and the bombers 
at the Boston Marathon.9  Although an American citizen stashed away in 
Yemen, al-Awlaki was not seeking a permit to march.  He was not 
challenging a prior restraint on his freedom to speak.  He could care less about 
testing America’s constitutional resilience.  Indeed, he was ultimately 
assassinated without the Constitution mattering in his defense.10  Yet, his 
own expressive conduct and unencumbered speech had been deadly—and it 
still is.  It is one thing to tolerate the legal shenanigans of domestic hate 
groups; it is quite another to apply the same principles of liberal lenience to 
allow the likes of an al-Awlaki to operate unhindered. 
And, yet, why should even a tamer version of terrorism thrive in the form 
of mundane hate groups?  All throughout Europein other Western 
democracies that purportedly share our values in governance for the common 
goodthese racist, anti-Semitic spectacles are prohibited.  In Germany and 
Austria, espousing Third Reich ideals or adorning Nazi symbols and 
paraphernalia warrants a prison sentence or a fine.11  In France, the anti-
Semitic rantings of a low-rent comic12 or the avowedly racist expressions of 
a soccer hooligan are criminal acts.  Perhaps, given that the Holocaust seared 
on their side of the Atlantic, Europeans are more painfully aware that such 
symbolic demonstrations can easily morph into book burnings, Nazi rallies, 
and death camps, which scarred their continent for an eternity.  Paradoxically, 
the United States fought a civil war over slavery and somehow the residue of 
racism that carried over into the postbellum South, in the sadistic form of 
lynchings and cross burnings, did not evoke the same level of revulsion. 
What do we know about free speech that these equally democratic societies 
apparently do not understand?  Why are they more fearful of becoming this 
 
 9. See Scott Shane, The Lessons of Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/magazine/the-lessons-of-anwar-al-awlaki.html 
[https://perma.cc/T9VV-CFJM]. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See Alexander Tsesis, The Empirical Shortcomings of First Amendment 
Jurisprudence:  A Historical Perspective on the Power of Hate Speech, 40 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 729, 773 n.332 (2000). 
 12. See Maia de la Baume, A French Jester Who Trades in Hate, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/movies/dieudonne-french-comic-behind-the-anti 
-semite.html [https://perma.cc/QJC6-JJJK]. 
2017] INTERNET AS MARKETPLACE OF MADNESS 597 
year’s model of “silly dupes” than are we?13  We all signed similar social 
contracts that were conceived by enlightened philosophers of exceptional 
eighteenth-century intellectual diversity:  Locke, Rousseau, Hume, Jefferson, 
and Kant. Yes, these are all white men from the Western world.  But the 
democratic ideal was their invention.  Liberty and autonomy were their 
signature achievements.  And, yet, given that America was present at the 
launch of these revolutionary ideas, why do Americans regard free speech so 
differently?  Why do they take it more seriously than the other Western 
governments that share a common democratic ancestry? 
For reasons that have never been found to be persuasive, the United States 
has a high tolerance, if not a death wish, for almost anything that comes out 
of a lunatic’s mouth.  It is far too easy to have almost any utterance qualify 
as expressive speech.  A mere germ of an idea apparently deserves protection 
rather than what is routinely done with ordinary germs. 
Nazis march in Skokie, Illinois; crosses are burned in Minnesota and 
Virginia; and the funeral of a dead marine is disrupted and desecrated in 
Maryland, all on account of America’s outlier approach to free speech 
guarantees.14  The latter example went before the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Snyder v. Phelps.15  Eight of the nine Justices found that the First Amendment 
protected the display of placards that read, “God Hates Fags,” positioned near 
a funeral where a father said his final goodbye to a son killed in action.16  
Such extreme accommodation of a twisted attempt at speech and a colossal 
violation of human decency oddly unites both Democrats and Republicans.17  
Aside from their agreement on the taking of such free speech liberties, and 
their apparent capacity to endure coarsened behavior on a limitless scale, they 
seem to agree on little else. 
Given our predisposition to contort the Constitution in ways that 
apparently less limber but equally democratic societies would not, what 
should be done with the special circumstances of terrorist incitement on the 
internet?  Even the most resolute free speech defenders recognize that some 
expressive conduct should not benefit from free speech protection.  “[F]alsely 
shouting fire in a [crowded] theater,”18 for instance, which is deemed 
unprotected nonspeech, made Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes immortal.  
These sensible words of judicial wisdom are no less apparent today. 
Surely there is a present-day Supreme Court Justice who can see the tragic 
analogy.  Enabling terrorist incitement online is the equivalent of shouting 
fire in the most jam-packed, stampeding, chaotic theater of all:  the internet.  
In Schenck v. United States,19 the Court faced a challenge to the Espionage 
Act, which criminalized false statements or false reports made with the intent 
 
 13. See United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 213 (2d Cir. 1950). 
 14. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379–80 (1992); Collin v. Smith, 578 
F.2d 1197, 1201–02 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 15. 562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
 16. See id. at 448, 454–55. 
 17. The First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause is perhaps the only provision of the Bill 
of Rights that crosses party lines and receives widespread bipartisan support. 
 18. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 19. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
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to jeopardize the success of the American military or promote the success of 
its enemies.20  Holmes established the groundwork for the incitement 
doctrine by requiring courts to examine the very nature of the words being 
used to determine whether the language or expressive conduct created a 
“clear and present danger,” especially in times of war, “that Congress has a 
right to prevent.”21 
The “clear and present danger” test is applicable to these even more 
perilous times.  The War on Terror is fought, to a large degree, online.  
Terrorist incitement on the internet, with its recruiting of volunteers and 
providing of information, undoubtedly promotes the success of America’s 
enemies.  The use and abuse of the internet for these purposes presents a clear 
and present danger, and is the “substantive evil[]”22 that Congress rightly 
should prevent. 
This symposium issue of the Fordham Law Review, and Professor 
Alexander Tsesis, should be commended for having assembled these 
important voices to jump-start an important conversation.  Perhaps this will 
be the final First Amendment frontier because terrorism provides the truest 
test or the ultimate challenge of what we really believe about the First 
Amendment.  In the ongoing saga of balancing civil liberties against national 
security, global terrorism reduces the former to an indulgence, while the latter 
screeches like a never-ending siren—even though the guardians of free 
speech make their own loud noise.  Terrorism places the “fighting words” 
doctrine from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,23 the incitement “to imminent 
lawless action” language in Brandenburg v. Ohio,24 and the “true threats” 
doctrine from Virginia v. Black,25 on red alert. 
Is terrorism the Rubicon of First Amendment jurisprudence?  At the very 
least, it should inspire a renewed understanding that the usual rationale for 
privileging speech over harm may not be appropriate when confronting 
Islamic extremism.  We may, indeed, be getting closer to a new reality. 
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,26 the Supreme Court heard a 
constitutional challenge to the Providing Material Support to Terrorists 
Act.27  The statute criminalized the incitement of coordinated conspiracies to 
give material assistance to terrorist organizations.28  Humanitarian Law 
Project, among other nonprofit organizations, wished to give legal advice to 
a number of designated terror groups.29  Some of these groups also had a 
charitable arm.30  This was not a case that presented imminent lawlessness or 
true threats.  The Court recognized, however, that providing material support 
 
 20. Id. at 51–52. 
 21. Id. at 52. 
 22. Id. 
 23. 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942). 
 24. 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (per curiam). 
 25. 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003). 
 26. 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 27. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a) (2012). 
 28. See id., see also Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 8–9. 
 29. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 10. 
 30. Id. 
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is not tantamount to harmless political advocacy—especially when the party 
has knowledge that the group is a designated terrorist organization.31  In this 
case, which directly involved terrorism, the Court was in no mood to excuse 
the threat away. 
It is unlikely, however, that the majority’s reasoning in Humanitarian Law 
Project will one day lead to the creation of a separate, categorical terror-
related free speech exception that would add a modern context to the 
Chaplinsky list.  It would be a credit to the Constitution, and to common 
sense.  But it is anathema to any reading of constitutional jurisprudence.  Yet, 
it might one day become a moral necessity even if it causes legal overreach 
concerns. 
Terrorism, after all, is “fighting words” on crack.  And treating acts of 
terror as a uniquely singular category of proscribed speech would set a 
benchmark, causing many a judge to fall off their benches, and throw down 
the gauntlet in reclaiming some First Amendment sanity.  It is simply not true 
that we have more to fear from virtually any compromise in civil liberties 
than we do from the people who actually blow things, and themselves, up. 
Let’s be clear as to what constitutes the specific types of dangers that 
terrorism presents on the internet.  Curtailing or stifling political advocacy is 
not the aim of this regulatory impulse.  This is solely about the government’s 
obligation to save lives and not allow the Constitution to become a plaything 
of sophistry and manipulation.  As introduced by Professor Tsesis in a timely 
and pivotal law review article about terrorism on the internet,32 there is a 
propaganda component where a favorable message about the murderous aims 
of terrorism are communicated to a susceptible audience.  The message is 
used to recruit volunteers.  Those new recruits become indoctrinated into 
jihadist ideology.  And those who choose to pursue the madness of 
martyrdom end up relying on the internet for access to instructional videos 
on how to make jihad real. 
That’s what this is about.  If someone wants to build a website where the 
virtues of Islam are being expounded without reference to caliphates, fatwas, 
calls to martyrdom, jihad, and fighting words doused in lighter fluid aimed at 
infidels, good luck and enjoy your First Amendment privileges.  Anything 
less, however, anything aimed at propaganda, recruitment, indoctrination, 
and instructions, are unqualified terrorist crimes, and should be prosecuted 
without any hindrance from First Amendment oversight. 
Without the internet, this entire terrorist enterprise, with its Stone Age 
mentality, goes back to the Stone Age.  The internet has become a terrorist’s 
best friend, which, ironically, makes strange bedfellows of Islamic extremists 
and porn addicts.  Both have benefitted enormously from the vast 
encyclopedic resources and stimulations of the online universe.  And the 
activities of both, strangely given their otherwise disparate habits, raise First 
Amendment concerns:  What smut is being made available on the internet 
 
 31. See id. at 37–38. 
 32. Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 VAND. L. REV. 651, 654 
(2017). 
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that satisfies Chaplinsky’s “lewd and obscene” disqualification from First 
Amendment protection?33 
And what mischief lurks online for a terrorist to consume that constitutes 
either “fighting words,” the “incitement of imminent lawlessness,” “true 
threats,” or poses a “clear and present danger” to Western civilization?34 
The answer to the first question is generally more objectionable to First 
Amendment court watchers than the answer to the second.  Pornography 
can’t seem to catch an intellectual break,35 whereas terrorism masks deeper 
expressive, ideological, political speech commitments that, in the minds of 
many, should receive First Amendment cover. 
Nevertheless, before the internet, a terrorist’s day was seldom busy, his or 
her head was less cluttered with the romance of jihad, and he or she was 
without an easily assembled gathering of like-minded friends.  And that’s 
what makes terrorism and the internet such a toxic, incitement-spiked brew. 
What of content neutrality?  Isn’t this classic viewpoint-based 
discrimination:   the criminalizing of Muslims in conversation about their 
religion—freedom of speech and religion trounced under the same regulatory 
hammer?  With a president in the Oval Office continually threatening a 
Muslim immigration ban, there is now greater sensitivity to keep the 
Constitution, and the balance of powers, in check; to not allow any 
precipitous movements that will make it more difficult to find our way back 
to constitutional normalcy. 
“Let’s leave the First Amendment alone,” is a familiar patriotic chant. 
Except we can’t pretend that terrorism is not the beneficiary of irrational 
First Amendment absolutism.  Terrorist incitement is not what the First 
Amendment was ever meant to safeguard; moreover, terrorist incitement is 
most decidedly not speech.  Propaganda, recruitment, indoctrination, and 
instructional videos do not involve the debating of ideas in some imaginary 
marketplace.  Those who log on to these websites are not casual connoisseurs 
of bloodlust.  They are not surfing for something interesting to bookmark in 
between purchases with Amazon Prime.  They have already reached their 
conclusions about infidels; those already predisposed to join a cause so 
incompatible with Western values have already made up their minds.  Would-
be terrorists are not looking for chatrooms as confessionals where they can 
express their ambivalence if not profound regret as to how Islam became both 
a religion of peace and also a prodigious killer of Muslims. 
As for the marketplace of ideas that Justice Holmes envisioned in his 
dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States,36 many assumptions are made 
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about such an intellectual souk, and it may actually exist in the abstract, but 
only when there are mutually reinforcing commitments among the makers 
and tradesmen in ideas.37  To succeed in such an enterprise, there must be 
faith in the free exchange of ideas.  And the good faith that all traders see 
themselves as stakeholders in the venture.  Finally, there must be a baseline 
acceptance that all have consented to a competitive market where those with 
the winning ideas get to go home alive. 
I know of no terrorist who has ever agreed to those terms or is willing to 
play under that set of rules.  When it comes to terror, ideas have no currency 
in any known marketplace.  The only known coin of the realm is violence. 
Ironically, the internet is the ultimate marketplace.  The valuations for 
Amazon and PayPal prove it; ecommerce will soon convert brick-and-mortar 
retail establishments into electric-charging stations for Teslas.  But the 
internet is not always an efficient marketplace—what with the trolls, Twitter 
wars, Facebook defriending, cyberbullying, slut-shaming, the posting of sex 
tapes, and overall lack of appetite for government oversight and regulation.  
Amid this cyber circus, efficiency is not expected, and terrorists take full 
advantage of the obscuring chaos. 
These terrorist websites are not harmless flirtations.  They are acts of war 
and should not be dignified as echo chambers of intellectual or religious 
curiosity.  They have the appearance of speech, but they lack the legal 
particles and moral entitlement of protected speech.  At bottom, they are at 
the lowest level of speech, truly guttural communication, and therefore 
nakedly without constitutional protection. 
The story of how we got to this place in First Amendment jurisprudence is 
well known, and legal scholars still battle over the meaning and continued 
relevance of the Supreme Court case that made an otherwise short 
amendment seem to read much longer and with greater complexity.  The 
Chaplinsky Court proscribed categories of unprotected speech that all 
essentially shared the same deficiency:  such speech represents “no essential 
part of any exposition of ideas” and possesses “such slight social value as a 
step to [the] truth that any benefit that may be derived from [its expression] 
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”38 
Chaplinsky is rightly remembered for introducing the “fighting words” 
doctrine, which, of course, has some relevance on the matter of terrorist 
language being openly posted on the internet.  But Chaplinsky may have had 
an even greater influence in drawing a distinction between high- and low-
value speech.  Yes, there are gradations of speech; qualitative standards with 
earned valuations.  Not all attempts at expression make the grade.  “A rose 
by any other name would smell as sweet” may be true of roses, but terrorism, 
and the words terrorists use to communicate their message, are not so easily 
interchangeable.  A terrorist is aptly named.  And remember:  Romeo dies in 
the end.  His actual name mattered, too. 
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Regulating low-value speech raises no constitutional infirmity even if the 
content of the speech—its viewpoint and what it has to say—provides the 
censuring impulse behind the government’s action.  That’s how little respect 
is afforded to speech that deserves none.  What matters more is its social 
value, whether the manner of expression is consistent with and respectful of 
the norms of social engagement. 
If the speech descends from the gutters, the Ground Zero of low-value 
speech, then it isn’t granted the privilege afforded to speech that aspires to 
actually say something meaningful and in a form that demonstrates a desire 
to be heard.  The intention behind the speech can’t be to harm, but to 
contribute to the public discourse; the advancement of democratic ideals; and 
the pursuit of such higher virtues as truth, beauty, science, and morality. 
Redeeming social and intellectual value has a place in the First 
Amendment conversation.  Judges should not live in fear of drawing lines 
and keeping score.  Otherwise, free speech is really about begrudgingly 
awarding the privilege to the most disparaging and uncivilized among us.  It 
doesn’t make America stronger to strengthen the hand of those who have no 
regard for social order—or America, for that matter.  It actually makes 
America less free when a hateful few conflate terror and speech as a ploy to 
terrorize our lives, restrict our movements, and upend our inner peace.  
Permitting them to do so does not preserve freedom, nor is it a sign of virtue.  
It’s the quiet surrender of a hostage. 
Specifically, Chaplinsky defined “fighting words” not merely as speech 
likely to result in a breach of the peace but also as language that violated the 
fundamental standards of decency and civility—“the social interest in order 
and morality.”39 
Chaplinsky should be read as allowing the government to treat terrorism 
on the internet as low-value speech that has no content-based implications.  
Terrorism is about fomenting terror—it is meant solely to terrorize.  It is 
threatening in word and deed, and by its own evil design.  Under the Court’s 
ruling in Virginia v. Black,40 “true threats” also fall into the category of low-
value speech because they threaten a “fear of violence.”41  The engendering 
of “fear” is precisely what terrorist incitement on the internet seeks to 
accomplish:  making fear operational. 
Terrorism poses a serious threat of violence and a danger to America’s 
national security.  The internet, a dubious marketplace of ideas, is a breeding 
ground for budding terrorists and an incubator of incitement.  The 
punishment and regulation of such low-value speech poses no constitutional 
infirmity. 
In addition to making arrests of suspected terrorists and prosecuting 
crimes, the government should shut down websites, freeze bank accounts, 
conduct surveillance, and create “No Fly Lists.”  Life should be made much 
harder to live online with a terrorist agenda.  The barriers to entry that once 
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made incitement to violence that much more difficult in the days before the 
internet should be resurrected in our cyberage.  Not only is America an outlier 
in its reluctance to prosecute hate crimes, it is a laggard on “incitement” 
generally—all because of a pathological fear of offending the First 
Amendment.  Meanwhile, the rest of the Western world takes precautions, is 
far more comfortable regulating hate speech and prosecuting terror, and yet 
still celebrates its democratic ideals and liberal character. 
Perhaps they don’t wish to be remembered as “silly dupes?” 
